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by John White*
Aid to developing countries is a transfer of resources
which is normally judged successful or unsuccessful by the
extent to which it contributes to the recipient's economic de-
velopment. In the long and rather wearisome history of
attempts to make out an abstract case for such a transfer,
there is one continuing paradox. The more closely its justi
-
fication is tied to the promotion of development, the weaker
the case appears to become. To that has recently been added
another paradox. The most forceful critics of aid are no
longer the ruthless pursuers of the national self-interest or
the absolute advocates of laissez-faire. They are to be found
among precisely those people who are most firmly committed
to the planned promotion of economic development.
Both paradoxes are easily explained. They are merely a
reflection of the discrepancy between what the aid-givers do
and what they say they are doing. If the critics of aid were
content with demonstrating the not very surprising facts that
the aid-givers' motives are mixed and their actions inconsis
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tent, the argument would end there. But more is claimed.
In the aid debate, arguments take on an air of theology, with
one side arguing that grants and loans and technical assistance
are some sort of moral imperative, while the other side ar-
gues that the whole notion of deliberate action to promote
another country's development is fundamentally and necessarily
misconceived. This sterile and muddled debate is character-
ised by a general failure to distinguish between stated objec-
tives, unstated objectives, attainable effects, and observed
effects.
The trouble arises in part because of a problem of
definition. In the early 1950s, after the enactment of the US
Mutual Security Act, few people bothered to attack aid on
developmental grounds, for development was not its presumed
objective. Systematic analysis of aid in developmental terms
sprang from a series of events in the years 1957-1961 - the
establishment of the India Consortium, the coming of indepen-
dence in Africa, the renovation of the OEEC as the OECD,
the inauguration of the UN Development Decade and the cre-
ation of the Alliance for Progress. The point is that an
existing activity carne to be appraised in the light of an objec-
tive for which it was not designed.
With roughly ten years' experience of aid in the context
of developmental aspirations, a more fundamental re-appraisal
ought now to be possible. There is altogether too common a
tendency among the advocates of aid to assert the obligation to
help as a categorical imperative, and then to assume that aid
does help without further argument. It comes back again to
the problem of definition.
The ideal is clear enough - a transfer of resources
which promotes economic development. But that will hardly
serve as a definition. First, it begs the question of the
effect of aid. Secondly, it lacks the necessary connotation of
deliberate action, the intention to help. Thirdly, it merely
shifts the problem of definition a stage further, to "economic
development".
A nominalist definition of aid - anything we call "aid" is
aid - is objectionable for even more obvious reasons. It
forces the inclusion of items which should be discarded before
any argument about aid has even begun.
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The statistical definitions used by international organisa-
inS, while good enough for international comparisons, do not
provide an adequate basis for conceptual debate.
The problem of definition, however, can easily be dodged.
The criterion of success which was stated at the beginning of
this article identifies a class of transfers, without defining it.
It makes it clear what we are talking about, while leaving
open the awkward questions of motives and of actual results.
Assuming a common understanding of what is meant by
"economic development" (a dangerous assumption, to which I
shall return later), the aid debate comes down to three questi-
ons. First, to what extent can we identify successes and
failures? Secondly, were these successes and failures attri-
butable to the inherent characteristics of inter-governmental
transfers, to specific and remediable flaws in the forms of
transfer, or to external circumstances? Thirdly, if the
answer is external circumstances, are those circumstances
likely to be exacerbated or ameliorated in the context of the
aid relationship?
In the polemics of aid, the first question is usually
skipped. Yet it is crucial. To identify successes and fail-
ures requires, first, a value judgment concerning the kind of
success that one seeks, and then the isolation of the aid com-
ponent from a highly complex set of causal factors. In
practice - e. g. in Professor Hollis Chenery's attempts to
quantify the return on aid
- the interaction between aid and
other factors is often largely ignored. Yet the critics of aid
argue loosely that it is through these interactions that aid
does harm. What sort of harm, however, is usually only
vaguely specified. A more scrupulous scrutiny of the argu-
ments advanced will often reveal that the two sides mean
different things by "success". Indeed, it can be argued that
the whole search for "success stories" in aid, and the aiddebate itself, are misconceived, and that discussion in these
terms distorts and disguises more fundamental questions con-
cerning the nature of the development process.
Suppressing such doubts for the moment, one may turn
to the second question. Again, the question is usually wrong-ly posed. The critics of aid seldom examine alternative forms
of aid. Yet detailed assessments exist, not only in academic
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studies, but also in official publications, showing how the
value of aid is impaired by the donors' efforts to reduce the
cost, or to increase the gain, to themselves. Here one can
only re-iterate the sadly familiar catalogue; procurement tying,
the reluctance to provide non-project aid, biassed or incompe-
tent project selection, the hard terms of lending, the uncer-
tainty of future commitments, and above all the inadequacy of
the level of aid. Officials, who have to defend their existing
aid programmes, do their case no good by assuming that aid
which is weighed down in these ways is better than no aid.
Often it demonstrably is not. But it is surely an astonishing
logical jump to go, as the critics of aid often do, from demon-
strating that the developed countries have not helped enough to
the conclusion that they should not help at all.
The assertion that the flaws of aid are inherent in inter-
governmental transfers appears more damaging. But it is an
impossible assertion to substantiate, Aid is bound to fail,
says the pure laissez-faire economist, because it. concentrates
economic power in the public sector and frustrates the work-
ings of the market mechanism, Aid is bound to fail, says his
opposite number on the other side of the ideological fence,
because it strengthens the entrenched position of foreign pri-
vate investors and the wealthy elite in the developing countries
themselves. Aid is a waster of money, says the one, because
it goes to governments which are opposed to us politically.
Aid is vicious, says the other, because it bolsters subservient
puppet regimes. Aid distorts the economy, says the one,
because it encourages over-investment in large-scale projects
with long gestation periods. It is wasted, says the other,
because it all trickles away in high consumption.
Quite apart from the obvious fact that both arguments can-
not be right, neither can, for they are both self-contradictory.
They start by assuming a criterion of success and failure,
usually not stated. On the basis of empirical evidence they
then cite a number of alleged failures. Finally they assert
that the possibility of success, implicit in their original assum-
ption of a criterion of success, does not exist.
If the critic's case is weak in logic, empirically it is
weaker still, for the advocate of aid has only to secure agree-
ment on an objective and then produce one case in which it is
at least reasonable to suppose that the provision of aid contri-
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buted towards the objective. The critics o! aid do not nor -
mally quarrel with the stated objectives of aid, if only because
of a natural reluctance to admit that they are opposed in
principle to the promotion of other people's welfare.
At this level, however, the case for aid is weak also.
If the case is argued empirically, then it must be admitted
that there are grounds for doubting the real value of much
the aid that has been given during the past decade. If the
case is argued analytically, then the advocate of aid must dis-
miss every case of 'failure" on the ground that the aid was by
definition given in an inappropriate form or that there were
other circumstances beyond the aid-giver's control. An argu-
ment that can never be disproved is not an argument about the
real world at all.
All of this can be summed up very briefly. The oppo-
nent of aid, unwilling to admit that he wants to discriminate
between one developing country and another, or that he prefers
to ignore the needs of developing countries altogether, falls
back on an argument which suffers from the basic weakness of
being refutable by the production of a single contrary case.
The advocate of aid, unwilling to give a hostage to his critics
by admitting the manifest confusion of current aid practices,
takes refuge in a generalised moral imperative which suffers
from the basic weakness of not being empirically verifiable.
If the argument ever descends from this level of generalis-
ation, it is only in the context of dubious "success stories",
which open the way for unsubstantiated assertions about the
nature of "success", and its causes.
When the argument turns to the last of our three ques-
tions, concerning the effect of aid on the general climate for
development, the debate rises to a still cloudier level of
theology. At this level, almost every assertion rests on a
value judgment. One kind of critic, for instance, asserts
that the basic flaw in aid is its political motivation, which
leads aid-givers such as the USA to support authoritarian
right-wing governments. Aid ought to be used, he says, to
support progressive and revolutionary governments. And
what would that be, if not a political motivation?
If there is any content in the aid debate, however, it is
at this level that it is to be found, because it is here that the
value premises of the arguments emerge. That is the signi
ficance of our original paradox. If it were really true that
aid is neither governed nor justified by developmental criter
the argument would be totally non-prescriptive, a matter of
correlating empirical evidence. But it is not. Although non
developmental criteria largely govern the donor' s choice of
aid recipients, developmental criteria certainly enter into
decisions about the forms of aid, and even to some extent
about changes in the vo1um of aid.
So the aid-giver has to assess the recipient.s develop-
ment potential. In so doing, he necessarily makes valuejudgments about the relative desirability of different patterns
of development. There is no way in which he can extricate
himself from interference in the recipient's domestic affairs.
The mere act of giving aid - or withholding it - is itself a
form of interference, unless it is distributed automatically in
accordance with some absolutely neutral formula. There is
not, and cannot be, any such thing as objectivity in aid-giving.
So the moral question arises: is it right to introduce possibly
alien value judgments into the formulation of development
policy?
Since the question is a moral one, it can only be ans-
wered in moral, largely intuitive terms. Certainly the form-
alised "performance lending" approach adopted by the USA and
the World Bank, involving the imposition of conditions, is
rather unattractive, quite apart from any doubts one may have
about the possibility of applying the concept of performance
lending systematically, about the wisdom of some of the con-
ditions imposed, or about the practical consequences of such
restrictive methods. But it is not so certain that an aid-
giver is wrong to proclaim and to live by his own values, or
to challenge and question the assumptions on which the poli-
cies and practices of developing countries rest.
There is no doubt that the aid relationship carries some
profound risks. But acceptance of these risks seems prefer-
able to acceptance of the dogmatic assertion that there is
nothing the developed countries can do to help the developing
countries. Perhaps the critic of aid is not saying that. Per-
haps he is merely saying that the record of the past ten years
does not show the results he would like to see. But in that
case, he is not making a general assertion about aid. He IS
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making either a general value judgment about development, or
a specific assertion about the efect of tied credits, defence
support, the imposition of conditions, or whatever other as-
pect of current aid practices one chooses to attack. The
question is not whether to help, but how.
